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Abstract: Most online platforms are becoming increasingly algorithmically
personalized. The question is if these practices are simply satisfying users pref-
erences or if something is lost in this process. This article focuses on how to
reconcile the personalization with the importance of being able to share cultural
objects– including fiction–with others. In analyzing two concrete personalization
examples from the streaming giant Netflix, several tendencies are observed. One is
to isolate users and sometimes entirely eliminate shared world aspects. Another
tendency is to blur the boundary between shared cultural objects and personalized
content, which can be misleading and disorienting. A further tendency is for
personalization algorithms to be optimized to deceptively prey on desires for
content that mirrors one’s own lived experience. Some specific – often minority
targeting – “clickbait” practices received public blowback. These practices show
disregard both for honest labeling and for our desires to have access and repre-
sentation in a shared world. The article concludes that personalization tendencies
are moving towards increasingly isolating and disorienting interfaces, but that
platforms could be redesigned to support better social world orientation.
Keywords: algorithmic personalization, shared cultural objects, racial profiling,
data surveillance, social epistemology
1 Introduction
More and more, our informational, cultural, and social experiences are mediated by
algorithmically personalized platforms and other “smart” tools and applications. As
Reviglio and Agosti write in a recent paper: “Online personalization is our interface
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with the infosphere” (2020: 1). Algorithmic personalization is championed as a
necessary means to navigate the cluttered digital sphere and deal with information
and option overload. By way of personal data-driven algorithms our options can be
filtered, sorted, and presented in a curated way that optimize our interfaces and thus
serve experiences according to the preferences that we have expressed through the
data trail of our prior choices.What is not to love? Asmany scholars have pointed out,
there are some quite significant downsides and ethical worries around these powerful
algorithmic tools.1 Some consistently highlighted concerns:
1) Monetization: Conflict of interest, as data harvesting and predictive “optimi-
zation” is controlled by for-profit companies and their financial imperatives
(Zuboff 2019).
2) Manipulation: Personalized “choice architectures” as “hypernudging” (Yeung
2018) and imposing hidden coercive influences (Susser 2019).
3) Lack of transparency: Algorithms as legally protected as private and pro-
prietary (Cohen 2013) and operating like “black boxes” (Pasquale 2015).
4) Bias: “Smart” tech as perpetrating “algorithmic bias” and discrimination
(Benjamin 2019), e.g., via “social sorting” (Lyons 2003).
5) Filter bubbles: Personalization as trapping users in past preferences, “filter
bubbles” rife with polarization and misinformation (Hendricks and
Vestergaard 2019; Pariser 2011).
Relating to these five concerns, this article focuses on the value of being oriented in
our broader social world, and analyzes deceptive and disorienting features of
current personalization practices, which increasingly and imperceptibly mingle
individualized platform content with content originating beyond the platform.
While other scholars have raised worries around epistemic isolation, deception,
and manipulation, I highlight how the common and shareable world is getting
lost – or rather purposefully hidden, blurred, or misrepresented – and why this
matters also when it comes to cultural objects likes movies and entertainment.
I start by laying out some background concepts and insights and thenmove to
analyses of some concrete examples from Netflix. Here we see the present
tendencies to increasingly introduce personalized features and content that
respectively (1) hide and (2) deceptively blur or appear as shared social world
objects. Epistemically, these tendencies interact to create isolation from and
disorientation in regard to the overall landscape of our social world.
An analysis of how more precisely the core practices of algorithmic person-
alization disorients us is particularly important due to the fast-evolving tendencies
toward deeper personalization. But also given tech ‘giants’ – and the ‘press’ –
1 See also Yeung (2018) for a recent overview.
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narrow focus on content moderation. Moderation and censorship are important
issues. But when we talk about removal of false and misleading information, we
need to include a discussion about what we might dare call the “faking of the
shared world” which is not simply allowed by these platforms but business as
usual, and regularly purposefully optimized.2
Most epistemic worries hitherto have centered on peer-to-peer social media
platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. I focus on the entertainment
streaming service Netflix to broaden the debate and stress that shared social world
concerns go beyond factual claims, and that our cultural imagination also needs to
be shareable. Creative works are core avenues for cultural coordination, under-
standing, and tensions of identities and perspectives. But fiction and cultural
products need to be shared to serve these functions and not merely be ephemeral
individual fantasies. Robert Nozick (1974) famously proposed an “experience
machine” thought experiment to criticize hedonistic utilitarianism, and to high-
light the values lost if we individually plugged into a machine that could provide
whatever simulative experience we desired. One of the questions I shall raise is if
the tendencies of personalized entertainment platforms are taking us toward
precisely this kind of solipsistic hedonism that Nozick aimed to criticize.3
2 Unproblematic Personalization and Being
Locally Oriented
The critique is specifically directed at the epistemic harms of current algorithmic
personalization tendencies, not personalization more generally. I start with two
examples of personalization that are not inherently disorienting.
First, a basic example of personalized medicine: We are now finally in a world
where for example your temperature is not necessarily comparedwith the national
average but rather with your own baseline, or even better with your own variable
baseline as it oscillates given menstrual cycle and time of day. With such
personalization a patient’s current temperature can signal an aberration even
when falling within the broader population norms. The key is to see that this
personalization is transparent about its own self-oriented status. Indeed, the goal
2 McLuhan 1964 famous dictum: “Themedium is the message” certainly is an apt reminder when
considering Facebooks “supreme court” and its narrow jurisdiction as a “censored content” ap-
peals panel.
3 See Frischmann and Selinger (2018) for further thoughts on current experience machine
tendencies.
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is the health and self-care of the individual and the personalization is precisely
useful because the self-referential nature of the data is clear.
Secondly, in terms of subdivided spaces, another kind of personalization con-
cerns instances where one freely and knowingly enters distinct environments. A
classical unobjectionable personalized space is our homes, where others enter at
inhabitant’s permission and they are locally in control.4 But schools, movie theaters,
and other public and other-owned spaces are also subdivisions of the overall social
world, where we go with expectations of only meeting and being exposed to certain
others and certain events. We know from analyses by ecological psychologists how
our actions are deeply anchored in our perception of the “affordances” or possibilities
of a given environment, and that the ability to move and find our way between
different “behavioral settings” is essential to any meaningful freedom.5 Thus, the key
tounharmful personalization isfirstly thatweenter such spaces knowingly, and that it
is relatively transparent who we share – and don’t share – the space with. Secondly,
that we as free and oriented agents canmove to other settings with other possibilities.
Thus, if I go to see an obscuremovie at an arthouse theater, I knowingly pass through
several “filters,” but as I actively navigate there, I, for example, notice the near empty
room and the line at an interesting looking Korean thriller.
As we look at the Netflix case studies, these principles need to be kept inmind.
Some of the core problems with algorithmic personalization are that the affor-
dances are unclear, deceptive, or perhapsworst of all–missing.Weare undermost
current personalization regimes simply not offered the option to turn off person-
alization, and in that sense, the ability to “leave” or “move into” different
subdivided spaces within the platform. It is increasingly the personalized space
served – or nothing. Further, when options exist, they are not presented in an
ecologically meaningful way that is intuitive from the perspective of action.6
3 “Platform” Terminology as Giving Allure of
Stability and Public Access
As mentioned, the great promise and allure of the Internet and current service
platforms have been their unparalleled ability to aggregate and connect people
and all sorts of shared world contents and products across time and space. The
4 The home of 2021 is of course permeatedwith various screens and connectivities that make for a
more complex “personalized” picture – that precisely shall be discussed in this article.
5 See ecological psychologists Barker and Associates (1978) and Heft (2012).
6 Increasingly, options, for example, to “unsubscribe” are actively designed to be hidden. See
also Hartzog (2018).
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function of the platform, as suggested by Gillespie (2010), is to connect but also to
filter or censor. Thus, to create access but also prevent overload.
Already pre-internet personalization, many scholars already highlighted
how media like newspapers and television transformed our traditional
attachment of action and knowledge to a local time and space (e.g., Meyrowitz
1985). Many early analyses focused on how local spaces get transformed,
fractured internally, and united with other places as various forms of media
bridge spatio-temporal distances. Anthony Giddens (1991: 26) writes about
media as “modalities of reorganising time and space” and describes what he
calls the “collage effect” where “the event has become more or less completely
dominant over location, media presentation takes the form of the juxtaposition
of stories and items which share nothing in common other than that they are
‘timely’ and consequential.” Online platforms and their personalized user in-
terfaces certainly fits this rubric of the “collage effect” as content, posts, pro-
grams, and products are displayed in “feeds” and rank-ordered layouts that are
not connected by way of their contents or sources but according to their
assumed “timely” or “consequential” nature. As Giddens highlights, how in-
dividual pieces of the collage relate is mute, and the original home terrain of
these sources is pushed to the background. There is no landscape guiding our
wayfinding if you will, we must trust the curator.
Turning now to personalized platforms with van Dijck, Poell, and De Waal’s
(2018) definition: “An online ‘platform’ is a programmable digital architecture
designed toorganize interactions betweenusers—not just endusers but also corporate
entities and public bodies. It is geared toward the systematic collection, algorithmic
processing, circulation, andmonetization of user data” (p. 4). Nowplatforms via these
activities of programable real-time data collection, algorithmic processing, and or-
ganization add something to prior media connectivity and also to the basic collage
effect. We now have media that is not only generative through itsmediating powers,
but that actually is adaptive and active in its own right. The engineers and machine
learning algorithms that drive online platforms are decision-makers that constantly
“redesign” the appearance of the site based on their “sensors” – i.e., methods of data
collection – and the goals they have been optimized to achieve. In short, with the
advent of personalized platforms our core existential categories of active persons,
passive things, and sharable places are put into question.
This category-defiant nature of current personalization can be illustrated by the
guile of its own chosen label. Ironically, the word “platform” suggests something like
a solid foundation on which various forms of public exposure and engagement can
take place. Gillespie (2010: 348) uses the word “intermediaries” for companies “that
provide the storage, navigation, and delivery of the digital content of others.” He
discusses the connotations of the term “platform” as an “open, neutral, egalitarian
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and progressive support for activity” (p. 352), and the political incentives for com-
panies to embrace this descriptive label – rather than the perhaps more accurate
“digital service.” The “platform” terminology advantageously carries shared world
connotations and suggests a stable open and egalitarian foundation on which an
organic flux of public life can take place. However, this flux of people and products is
in fact not organic, but (1) a curated “collage effect” (not open, not neutral, and not
equally accessible) and (2) algorithmically personalized: Who and what is seen is
relative to the viewer. Thus, the connotations of the public platform metaphor are in
fact largely inverted.
Where old-fashioned newspapers and television channels would filter and funnel
viewers to curated andmostly self-produced contents, current peer-to-peer andmarket
platformsaremore like constantlymorphinghallwaysproviding individualized curated
access to certain shared world points –mostly – beyond itself. I say “mostly” because
what we see now are “platforms” that not only personalize user interfaces with curated
content of others but actually also generate their own content. Sometimes, this “own
brand” content is labeled as such, for example, “Amazonbrand” and “Netflix original.”
These products can only be accessed through a given platform, but they are still shared
worldobjects to thedegree thatmultiple users canaccess the exact samecontent. But as
discussed below, personalization creep might start to blur the boundary between the
platform as an intermediary to something beyond itself and the platform as generating
its own content and thus being its own “end station.”
This effect of morphing user interfaces is really like no other hitherto known
environment. It raises the question of whether these “sites” might neither be envi-
ronments nor really media – in the sense of “intermediaries.” In some ways, given
their personalized, morphing, and relatively non-shareable nature, they aremore like
individually generated dreamscapes. But yet very different from dreams, as these
“hallways” (1) facilitate real world perception and action and (2) they are created via
specific data flows by others often with conflicting interests and values. The question
is how we should deal with “user interfaces,” which reject existential categories of
places, things, persons – and even media – that we have evolved to take for granted
and base our knowledge and action structures on.
4 Perspectival Knowledge Dialectics and the
Common World as Socially Shareable
Turning now to the importance of being epistemically oriented in a socially
shareable world. Hannah Arendt (1958) for example vehemently stressed the
importance of the “public” as a place of visibility and social reality:
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[T]he term “public” signifies the world itself, in so far as it is common to all of us and
distinguished from our privately owned place in it. This world, however, is not identical with
the earth or with nature, as the limited space for the movement of men and the general
condition of organic life. It is related, rather, to the human artifact, the fabrication of human
hands, as well as to affairs which go on among those who inhabit the man-made world
together. (p. 52)
After setting up this “fabricated” aspect of the shareable social world, she turns to
its function and perhaps most interestingly she anticipates the challenges posed
by “mass society” as she calls it:
The public realm, as the commonworld, gathers us together and yet prevents our falling over
each other, so to speak. What makes mass society so difficult to bear is not the number of
people involved, or at least not primarily, but the fact that theworld between themhas lost its
power to gather them together, to relate and to separate them. (ibid. p. 52)
Arendt makes two important claims here: (1) The functional claim – that the world
we share in common serves to both join us in a society and separate us as
individuals, and (2) her worry that without such shared world constraints we will
find ourselves weirdly merging with and yet uncoupled from each other.
This dual role of the sharedworld can also be understood as a social extension
of the more basic epistemological claims of developmental psychologist Jean
Piaget. Piaget expresses how, given the perspectival nature of perception, we
understand both ourselves and the world through understanding our relationality
to the world and each other. If this dialectic process is prevented, we fail to
understand both ourselves and our worlds:
[I]t is preciselywhen the subject ismost self-centered that he knows himself the least, and it is
to the extent that he discovers himself that he places himself in the universe and constructs it
by virtue of that fact. In otherwords, egocentrism signifies the absence of both self-perception
and objectivity, whereas acquiring possession of the object as such is on par with the
acquisition of self-perception. (Piaget 1954, p. xii)
The question will be if our dialectic self-positioning is challenged by algorithmic
personalization, and if we are in risk of self- andworld-ignorant egocentrism. Note
that the personalized medicine and home examples above are not “ego-centrism”
in Piaget’s sense, but simply instances of a local or self-directed focus. The dif-
ference lies in knowing that one is looking toward oneself or one’s own local
environment. The directedness is transparent and the “looking away” from the
public is purposive. In short, to turn away from a public world knowingly we need
to be oriented. The question is how we keep this orientation when platforms
imperceptibly divide and herd users, via individualized routes to material that
might or might not be shared with others.
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In sum, we normally understand our shared world through social and spatial
triangulations, that allow us to situate our own perspective. Both actualmovement
through a stable world and the views of others support our ability to integrate and
contrast our perspective with those of others. Without triangulating contrasts, we
are not merely stuck in a narrow view, we actually fail even to understand our-
selves and our local or private worlds. The socially shareable world is the scene or
environment thatmakes this social triangulation possible, but it is also the cultural
objects that are placed between us, and thus made available for public
consideration.
5 Shared Cultural Objects and “Windows” and
“Mirrors” in Fiction
As mentioned, the socially shared world is not uniform but provides a host of
subdivided spaces where we can become aware of – and purposively seek or
avoid – commonalities and differences of perspective. This multiplicity of per-
spectives and settings themselves can indeed become objects of public attention
via various cultural and artistic products. Such products are part of our cultural
fabric and generally created for the purpose of public viewing and social acces-
sibility. Further, this accessibility makes these works capable of shaping our
collective imaginaries and our views of ourselves and each other. Now with the
notion of epistemic triangulation and Arendt’s explanation of how the fabricated
human world functions to both relate and separate us, we can turn to the function
more specifically of fictional cultural objects as they are – pace Arendt – “placed
between us.”
We will here look to a famous distinction made by educator Emily Style. She,
in the context of curriculum curation, introduced the metaphorical categories
“mirrors” and “windows” as referring to literature that respectively (1) reflects
one’s own experience and identity (mirrors) and (2) expand one’s horizon with
experiences very different from one’s own (windows). Her point is that students
need both. But her idea is not simply that the “mirror” stories help us understand
ourselves and the “window” stories of the world, but – much like suggested by
Piaget and Arendt – that there is a more complex dialectic of learning when both
these kinds of stories are put between us.
Highlighting knowledge as perspectival, Style writes: “Basic to a liberal arts
education is the understanding that there is more than one way to see the world;
hence, a balanced program insists that the student enters into the patterning of
various disciplines, looking at reality through various “window” frames” (1988: 1).
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Interacting with this recognition that we do not experience or stand in the same
relation to the world, Style – in 1988 – highlights the historic and persistent
inequities of representation. She writes:
White males find, in the house of curriculum, many mirrors to look in, and few windows
which frameothers’ lives.Women andmen of color, on the other hand, find almost nomirrors
of themselves in the house of curriculum; for them it is often all windows. White males are
thereby encouraged to be solipsistic, and the rest of us to feel uncertain that we truly exist. In
Western education, the gendered perspective of the white male has presented itself as
“universal” for so long that the limitations of this curriculum are often still invisible. (Style
1988:4)
Thus, the value of mirror literature is not only for students to read stories that
reflect their own lives, but to know that their lives are important enough to be
written about and be read about by others. In Style’s words:
All students deserve a curriculum which mirrors their own experience back to them, upon
occasion— thus validating it in the public world of the school. But curriculummust also insist
upon the fresh air of windows into the experience of others—who also need and deserve the
public validation of the school curriculum. (Style 1988: 4, my italics)
Seeing oneself on the page in a “mirror” story helps not only self-understanding
but also self-worth precisely because this book is shared in common with others
and given public validation. Thewindow story is “fresh air” as it lets us seemore of
the world. A “mirror” story for one is a “window” for others – and having both is
crucial for understanding our broader social fabric.
6 Some Examples from Netflix
With this we can now turn to the analysis of actual personalization practices.
Methodologically, “getting the facts” about current personalization is notoriously
hard, precisely due to how current algorithms and company choices are pro-
prietary and often camouflaged to users. End-user access and analysis depends on
(1) companies’ willingness to voluntarily share information and (2) on creating
sharedworld archives7 and comparisons between the different user interfaces. The
irony therefore is that good empirical analyses would benefit from transparency,
user opt-outs, and forms of access, which are precisely currently wanting.
7 The Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine is a glorious resource for snapshots of non-
personalized “shared world” websites and a great tool to track changes over time. But when the
user interfaces are personalized the question is how to document and archive that?
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Netflix, like most platforms, use proprietary algorithms in their content
curation, search rank, layout, etc. These general forms of “collage effect”
personalization will not be our focus. Rather, I shall focus on two specific Netflix
personalization practices, instituted over the past decade, about which there has
been some public discussion and documentation.8 The first pertains to their
feedback and evaluation system, where Netflix havemoved from reviews and star-
ratings to “thumbs up/down” and “%match.” The second example has to do with
imagery and the move from movie posters to personalized cover art.
6.1 Netflix 1: From Stars and Reviews to Likes and Matches
Readersmay recall that Netflix up until 2017 had a rating systemwhere eachmovie
had a 1–5-star rating. What might be less known is that these stars were person-
alized– not an objective average as users typically expect from such stars. In a 2017
tech interview, Netflix executive Camron Johnson explained the systems as follows
“Netflix’s star ratings were personalized, and had been from the start. That means
when you saw a movie on Netflix rated 4 stars, that didn’t mean the average of all
ratings was 4 stars. Instead, it meant that Netflix thought you’d rate the movie 4
stars, based on your habits (and other people’s ratings)” (McAlone 2017) I shall
discuss this kind of personalization below, but first a note on the history. Johnson
highlights that their stars were personalized “from the start,”; however, the fuller
story is that up until 2015, Netflix would – under their personalized star rating
iconography – show two different numerical ratings: One personalized labeled
“Our best guess for [insert username]” along with an objective and straight-
forward average, including the base number of overall ratings (Armstrong 2015,
Figure 1). Further, these quantitativemeasures were also accompaniedwith access
to all qualitative reviews written by other viewers. Hence, pre-2015 there were two
“shared world” elements: (1) the objective quantitative average and (2) the qual-
itative reviews. Note also that the personalized rating could be triangulated and
interpreted on the background of the average to provide the viewer with some
sense of the work of the personalization process.
In 2015 the straight-forward average was dropped – along with the anchoring
“shared world” baseline that it provided – and only the personalized stars and
numerical rating remained. And then in 2017 the star rating system was dropped
altogether for an entirely new system. Johnson explained the latter shift as follows:
“[The shift] came from the realization that Netflix had always used star ratings
8 I base the factual part on news articles as well as Netflix’s own posts and promotional material
(and my own experience as longtime customer).
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differently than the rest of the Internet, but that this distinction wasn’t clear to
users” (McAlone 2017). Further, Johnson publicly confirmed that “many people
didn’t get” (ibid) their personalized system, and also that it was misleading given
expectations from other sites. Take Amazon, for instance. “In those contexts, those
star ratings are an average. People assumed Netflix was the same” (ibid). The stars
were deceptive in the sense that they gave the allure that one was looking to the
broader social world of other viewers’ feedback, when in fact the stars were user-
referential or rather user-taste-predictive.
Turning now to the new “thumbs up/down-%match-system,”which replaced
the personalized stars in 2017. I here transcribe a Netflix promotional video
explaining the shift:
Netflix ratings are getting a makeover. The stars are no more. A misunderstood hero … The
stars were always a prediction of what you may enjoy, not the critics, not your neighbor, not
your cat. Ratings onNetflix havenever been a reflection of popularity. So youmight have seen
1 star forHouse of Cards but your politics-obsessed cousin could see 5.Which iswhywe found
a better way to help you find the perfect match. It’s kind of like dating apps, actually. Netflix
will find shows that seem like a fit, 23% Match, 95%Match. Then you can decide if it’s true
love – or not. This helps Netflix get to know you better. And make smarter more personalized
recommendations. Finding love is hard. Finding your next binge doesn’t have to be.9
Figure 1: Screenshot Netflix, The Interview, desktop double rating system (Armstrong 2015).
9 Text transcribed from YouTube video “Introducing Thumbs” posted to Netflix official channel
on April 5, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=as4pZhodG5I&feature=emb_logo.
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The new “perfect match” system does appear less misleading. Now viewers simply
see the algorithmically generated “%match”under each programandare given the
opportunity to further train the algorithm with the “thumbs up/down” after each
program consumed. In terms of what this new system can do, Netflix suggests that
it provides us with a sense of whether a program will be “a match” for us indi-
vidually and the ability to improve the personalized suggestions through
feedback.10
Netflix explicitly contrasts this personalized “dating app” style rating with
what “critics” or “neighbors”might like. This fact that Netflix would like to move
us away from being public critics is quite important. Here a passage from the 2017
McAlone interview:
The other problem Netflix hopes the change will take care of is people’s tendency to get into
criticmodewhen they see star ratings. Instead of saying howmuch they enjoyed a show, they
tried to assess its objective worth. “What we observed was a difference between what [users]
say,” in terms of ratings, “andwhat they do,” in terms of actuallywatching. Peoplemight rate
a guilty-pleasure sitcom lowand then keepwatching, andwatching, andwatching. “Whatwe
saw with ‘thumbs up’ and ‘thumbs down’ more aligned with what people actually play,”
Johnson said.
Johnson here lays out why they don’t want us in “critic mode,” as reviews written
under such a mind-set aims to evaluate “objective worth.” Given our background
discussion of Style and Arendt, it makes sense that when we think we are speaking
to others, we would attempt to be somewhat objective – even as we express our
own perspective. In a sense, the perception that something is socially accessible to
others might make us try to meet them halfway. But we also might be more
idealistic or aspirational in such reviews.Wemight, as Netflix data suggested, tone
down our “guilty-pleasure” preferences in public. Perhaps because we have a
purpose – beyond hedonistic pleasure –when engaging others. Why take the time
to rate and write reviews for others if not to try to shape their views, actions, and
our overall public imaginary?
Now this is notably not Johnson’s angle. He does not consider that users might
desire to access the reviews and opinions of others or have a chance to influence the
shared world via their feedback. Rather, themove to the “thumbs-up/down-%match”
system is explained as providing better individual feedback. McAlone (2017) writes:
“[Users] didn’t understand that themore they rated, the better the systemwould be at
understanding their tastes.” In other words, the new system more transparently tells
theuser that their feedback simply is for training the algorithm to their tastes.Now this
10 See Tassi (2017) for an argument that even as a personalized tool the binary choice between
“thumbs up/down” is quite blunt, and that absent a baseline it is unclearwhat exactly the%match
tells us.
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means that the personalized starswere not justmisleading tousers, theywere in fact–
via this misperception – harming the usefulness of the user feedback for training the
algorithm in twoways: (1) People got into “criticmode” and expressedmore objective
rather than purely subjective views, and (2) they gave too little feedback. Both of these
are clearly influenced by people’s expectation that they were speaking to others and
send their reviews into a shared world. Now in terms of the deceptive star system the
fact was that they didn’t. But we can now see why Netflix didn’t simply rectify the
deceptionbyaligning their star ratingwith other consumer sites likeAmazon that uses
an average.What Netflix’s newmatch systemdoes instead is to embrace a completely
solipsistic rating experience – just the individual user and their algorithm. The move
away from the shared world in the rating arena was completed with the discontinu-
ation and deletion of all user reviews in 2018. A journalist sums up the loss thus: “The
peer-to-peer recommendation has taken another hit” (Reisinger 2018).
So, to sum up, Netflix’s star system was personalized, and particularly
deceptively so after 2015. The new thumbs-match system is more honest about its
personalized nature. But it was introduced along with a move to phase-out of
actual reviews, thuswhatwe are left with, in terms of evaluation, is a complete solo
experience. The question is if the embracement of purely solitary predictive
evaluations is an “improvement”? The problem – which is now at least glaringly
obvious – is that the current platform does not allow for a shared world of publicly
expressed opinion. As expressed in a Forbes article “right now there is quite
literally nothing that indicates the level of quality of any shows or movies on
Netflix.” Overall, this history of Netflix ratings highlights the tendency toward
personalization and user isolation, and the loss of both social access and the
aspirational “critic mode” that can come with acting and evaluating in public.
6.2 Netflix 2: From Movie Posters to Personalized Artwork
In this section I discusswhat Netflix calls its “artwork personalization.”Back in the
early days of the company, the images seen on the Netflix site were limited to
official promotionalmaterial for themovie or show in question, that is, posters and
DVD cover art from the production company. However, as remarked by tech writer
Dany Roth: “Using officially sanctioned art by a film or show’s marketing team
might seem like a no-brainer, but it’s not necessarily as helpful as you might
think.” (Roth 2020). One problem was basic size and layout. But it was clear from
early on that the company was interested in using their data-driven analytics to
optimize the power of pictures well beyond creating a layout fit. In a 2016 post on
Netflix Innovation blog, Nick Nelson summarized the findings regarding the
importance of their artwork imagery:
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In early 2014, we conducted some consumer research studies that indicated artwork was not
only the biggest influencer to a member’s decision to watch content, but it also constituted
over 82% of their focus while browsing Netflix. We also saw that users spent an average of 1.8
seconds considering each title they were presented with while on Netflix. We were surprised
by howmuch impact an image had on amember finding great content, and how little timewe
had to capture their interest (Nelson 2016)
Now given this enormous power of artwork images in viewer decisions, they
quickly became a focus for algorithmic “optimization.” Thus around 2015
Netflix started to produce its own artwork and began to A/B test the relative
effectiveness of various different images pertaining to the same titles (Krishnan
2016). In this initial phase of image optimization Netflix was still looking to
present the same images to all users, just to use experimentation to identify the
artwork with the best “take rate” – as they poetically call the image-clicks
correlation (Krishnan 2016). However, as A/B testing is onboarded people
experimented on are effectively already seeing different images.11 And, as
reported on the Netflix Technology Blog, soon thereafter image personalization
was put to systemic use:
In previouswork, we discussed an effort to find the single perfect artwork for each title across
all ourmembers…. However, given the enormous diversity in taste and preferences, wouldn’t
it be better if we couldfind the best artwork for each of ourmembers to highlight the aspects of
a title that are specifically relevant to them? (Chandrashekar et al. 2017)
This goal became a reality in Fall 2017when a new artwork selection algorithmwas
rolled out “to its now 137 million subscriber-base.”12 This change went under the
radar for many users – still does for many today. But some curious events in 2018
around the use of minor supporting Black actors in “cover art” drew social media
attention to the phenomenon of individual image personalization. A reaction
quoted from a Guardian article goes as follows:
On Twitter, Stacia L Brown, a writer and creator of the podcast Hope Chest, asked: “Other
Black@netflix users: does your queue do this? Generate posters with the Black cast members
on them to try to compel you to watch? This film stars Kristen Bell/Kelsey Grammer and these
actors [figure 2c] had may be a 10 cumulative minutes of screen time. Twenty lines between
11 As methodology of A/B testing is key to much platform personalization it is important that its
process and prevalence is understood. Many people think that personalization is driven only by
“passive” data collection along with volitional user feedback – like thumbs up/down on Netflix.
However, A/B testing is precisely “testing” and not simply collecting data. It is actively generating
data by a behaviorist approach of dividing audiences, exploring and comparing “responses” to
different “stimuli”. Experimental data is often more valuable than passively collected data, pre-
cisely because it is linked to hypothesis testing.
12 See Iqbal (2018).
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them, tops.” Underneath she posted Netflix’s promotional artwork for the film Like Father,
specifically presented to her with the black actors Leonard Ouzts and Blaire Brooks. (Iqbal
2018)
Linking back to Style’s windows and mirrors distinction, what Brown basically
captured was that certain viewers “like her”14 were presented with imagery that
basically suggested this would be a mirror story for Black people, when in fact it
was – yet another –white window story. The deception aspect is echoed by others
interviewed:
“This feels like a step too far,” said Tobi Aremu, 26, a film-maker from Brooklyn. Recently he
watched the film Set It Up, “which was made to look like a two-hander between Taye Diggs
and Lucy Liu, but they were secondary characters in the love story of a young white couple!”
To him, the misrepresentation of Netflix’s actual offer felt problematic. “It’s beyond feeling
duped,” he said. “Because if something is black, I take no offence in being catered to. I am
black, givemeblack entertainment, givememore–but don’t take something that isn’t and try
to present like it is. I wonder what the makers of those shows and films think. If it was me, I
would be very upset.” (Iqbal 2018)
Figure 2: From left: 2.1 poster from Imdb.com, 2.2 personalized artwork – Bell. Photo by Kelly
Quantrill (@codetrill), 2.3 personalized artwork – Ouzts/Brooks. Photo by Stacia Brown’s
(@slb79) see tweet above.13
13 Images 2.2 and 2.3 also reproduced in Iqbal (2018).
14 Note that Netflix denies targeting black viewers but not consumers of black content: “We don’t
ask members for their race, gender or ethnicity so we cannot use this information to personalise
their individual Netflix experience. The only information we use is a member’s viewing history.”
(Iqbal 2018).
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I quote at length as this passage capture several important dynamics. I shall return
to the comments about whether the “makers of the show’ knew below. But first,
Aremu expresses that the personalized imagery was deceptive in terms of the
product, and that the pushback was exacerbated by how the deception played on
the desire for Black content (recognized by the Netflix algorithm) and then utilized
by Netflix (in their clickbait image production) to serve more white mainstream
American culture.
Netflix in 2017 explains their picture choices and personalized algorithmic
pairing as follows:
If the artwork representing a title captures something compelling to you, then it acts as a
gateway into that title and gives you some visual “evidence” for why the title might be good
for you. The artwork may highlight an actor that you recognize, capture an exciting moment
like a car chase, or contain a dramatic scene that conveys the essence of a movie or TV show.
(Chandrashekar et al. 2017)
Hence the deception pickle – with Black side-characters featured prominently in
thumbnails for audiences with Black content in their viewing history – is actively
produced: If “success rate” is optimized irrespective of thoughts about precision –
that is, “false-positives” and “false-negatives” – then the actual relevance of the
image to the program content is at best marginally relevant. The algorithm – and
the picture array – is in this sense built to create distortions that would generate
clicks (like these cases with black actors inminor roles), and not to prevent them.15
“If we present that perfect image on your homepage (and as they say: an im-
age is worth a thousand words), then maybe, just maybe, you will give it a
try.” (Chandrashekar et al. 2017) As we saw in the previous section regarding the
“%match” system, Netflix is here again using something like a dating analogy: It is
simply about making you “give it a try,” that is, click.
Above, I suggested that the “%match” systemwasmore honest, yet that it was
problematic due to the loss of a space for users to share reviews or access any
evaluation of quality. I called the personalized stars deceptive but suggested –
referring back to Arendt – that the current system exemplifies the tendency to
enclose individual users/viewers in solipsistic spaces, where the shared world is
hidden from view. Now with the personalized artwork I suggest we have a case of
both deception – in two senses – and a receding rather than disappearance of the
shared world. But a little more needs to be said before I can make this argument.
15 The algorithm likely starts with assuming the viewer-content pairing and then compares (1) the
individual’s viewing history – and proprietary predictive profile – to (2) the range of available
artworks –which clearly can stray far from core content, to then (3) present the image predicted to
maximize a click/watch.
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Currently, when we click a program, we are being connected with a creative
product that can also be accessed by others – it is part of the shareable world. I
return to tendencies of own-brand content and deep personalization later. But for
now, after we select – or fail to stop auto-play – we presumably exit the person-
alized “morphing hallway” and walk through a door to a shared cultural world if
you will. Given this eventual arrival in the shared world, many people might be
relatively unbothered by what goes on the way there. That is, the fact that I cannot
currently know what others see in their respective algorithmically curated user
interface. Many might say, as long as the artworks are not misleading in terms of
the program contents, like in the cases discussed above, there is no problem with
the separate fact that we are not seeing the same images.
But here I want to return to the last part of Aremu’s comment above, where he
takes us beyond the experience and desire of the individual user to the “makers of
those shows and films.” The question is if they knew about the imagery used?
Aremu, himself a filmmaker, concludes: “I would be very upset.” Beyond the user
expectation to not have titles falsely advertised, we also see the expectation that
the imagery is produced or at least approved by the creators of the content. In
short, most people upon seeing cover art think that they are seeing the world
beyond Netflix’s algorithmic hallway.
Another artwork scandal recently unfolded around the French movie Cuties
where Netflix eventually apologized for using personalized thumbnail pictures
that focused on sexualization of minors (Rosen 2020). Cuties does feature minors
dancing suggestively, but it arguably does not do so uncritically. The issue is that
algorithms “sell” a program with the images predicted to have the highest “suc-
cess” rate. Netflix, with their image creation choices and algorithms, actively
generates these scandals as appropriate cover art simply does not equal “success
rate.”Appropriate images arguablyfit both the content and the creators’ intent and
aspirations. In short, it is not just an image but a “cover” and an “artwork.”
As personalized star ratings deceptively played on shared-world expectations,
Netflix’s creation of an array of personalized images certainly seems similarly
problematic. In fact, three kinds of deception can now be distinguished: images (1)
misrepresenting content and (2) playing on expectations of being shared cultural
objects and (3) not originating with content producers. I suggest that while the first
kind was egregious in the cases discussed, the two other shared world disorien-
tations must be taken seriously as well – particularly given Netflix’s own data that
these images by far are the key variable to our attention and choice.
However, we should also remember that our knowledge and expectations
about personalization constantly shift. Our current expectations – also in regard to
home entertainment – are that we are coming into contact with aworld beyond our
screen. But we might no longer expect that our colleague has the same Netflix
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image in mind as us. Given the functions of the shared social world discussed
above via Arendt, Piaget, and Style, the problem is not limited to deception or
current expectations. Rather, knowledge of personalization leaves the coreworries
intact, and I suggest that beyond deceptive targeting we should worry about the
core ambiguity, lack of transparency, and general creep of targeted content. When
the sharedworld is not completely hidden, but just non-transparently pushed back
like in the Netflix artwork case, a new problem arise as we are increasingly losing
the ability to understand when we are in a personalized space versus in a shared
world. We are getting disoriented as our interfaces prohibit us from triangulating
our own perspective via that of others, and the ability to know whether and when
what one is seeing is what others see.
In sum, theseNetflix cases illustrated a couple of distinct worries: (1) deceptive
elements as our expectations are violated and (2) the tendency for the sharedworld
to be hidden (%match system) or to recede further into the background (person-
alized artwork). But I also highlighted the epistemic harm that arises from these.
Namely (3) the disorientation that comes from not being able to tell where
personalization ends and the shared world begins.
7 A Future of “Deep” Personalization, “Experience
Machines” and Social Isolation?
As discussed, a core attraction of social or market “platforms” is that they are
“sites”where one can encounter products or people that themselves are situated –
or originates from – beyond that platform. Thus, the platforms rely on the allure of
a broader common world.
With social media sites, one seeks access to a publicly accessible space and
expects to meet others and to “appear” oneself, as Arendt would say. With mar-
ketplaces and streaming services like Amazon and Netflix one expects to see
products that come from a world beyond the site, or at least are the same for other
viewers/customers.16 But there is currently an increasing tendency for streaming
services to entice their audiences with “own brand” content that they can keep as
exclusive on their platform.17 This puts a new spin on our “morphing hallway”
metaphor, as the platforms in these cases in a sense keep you there.
16 Relatedly note also platforms’ increasingly personalized and dynamic pricing schemes.
17 The discussedmovie Like Father is actually a “Netflix Original” accessible only through Netflix. I
included a movie poster posted to IMDb.com in Figure 2.1. But note that with the tendency of
platforms to produce their own content, the very notion of an “official poster” is likely crumbling.
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In his 2011 book The Filter Bubble, Eli Pariser quite astutely anticipated many
possibilities that now, a decade hence, are coming into full view. One worry that
Pariser raisedwas what we can call “deep personalization.”He envisioned it in the
context of personalized product placement:
If the product placement and advertiser-funded media industries continue to grow, person-
alization will offer whole new vistas of possibility. Why name-drop Lipslicks when your
reader is more likely to buy Cover Girl? Why have video-game chase scene through Macy’s
when the guy holding the controller is more of an Old Navy type? When software engineers
talk about architecture, they’re usually talking metaphorically. But as people spend more of
their time in virtual, personalizable places, there’s no reason that these worlds can’t change
to suit users’ preferences. Or, for that matter, a corporate sponsor’s. (Pariser 2011)
This worry about deep personalization seems like it might indeed be coming
closer, given the analysis of Netflix’s personalization innovations and the
increasing tendency toward home-grown “original” content. Just as Netflix can
produce multiple images for different target audiences, they could in principle
also produce variations of the same movie or show. Similarly, the algorithm
could “match” the “optimal” content version with each viewer. This is utterly
doable.
Such personalized entertainment products could vary according to product
placement – paid for by third party commercial entities – as envisioned by Pariser.
This is likely to happen in multiple arenas. However, a different or additional
possibility is that platforms had a set of productions of the “same” program that
featured different actors and would be produced to fit different audiences for “best
match” or “mirror story” consumption. In this case, we can imagine a case where
Taye Diggs and Lucy Liu in fact was the leading couple – in one version of Set It up.
Thus, if the personalization went all the way down, in this way there would be no
question of false advertising or of being duped into watching. We could then all
find our 100% match 100% of the time and watch mirror stories or whatever our
hearts desire, ad infinitum.
Returning now to Nozick’s “experience machine,” the first question is if the
tendencies of personalized entertainment platforms are taking us toward this kind
of solipsistic hedonism? Certainly, we saw in the Netflix examples both the focus
on “matching” and on getting the viewer to the “next binge,” as well as the
tendency toward deeper and deeper personalization. A second question is whether
an “experience machine,” increasingly optimized to fit our inferred preferences, is
what we want? A third question is if in fact, in the context of cultural products, the
notion of desire or “preference” is actually inherently anchored in the social world,
and thus that our “content” preferences rely inherently on expectations of these
being shareable cultural objects.
Consequences of Deepening Algorithmic Personalization 93
Going back to Style, she emphatically conveyed that a diverse curriculum is
not simply for everyone to see themselves, it is also to have these stories “vali-
dated” “in the public world of the school.” The fact that a mirror story is shared –
and can serve as a window as well – is likely essential to the enjoyment and value
we find in it, even if we watch/read it alone. Mirror stories watched in the
personalized “experiencemachine”would not do this job. Thus, wemight not only
want to watch this or that content that preference might be related to, for example,
a desire to see the world shift its priorities toward this kind of content. Hence,
having it be available for others might be part of the “individual preference.”
Netflix noted that we tend to “get into critic mode” and be too “objective”with
public evaluations. Similarly, we put aspirational programs on our watchlist. This
is likely content that would challenge, teach, or socially engage us – in short –
what we ought to watch. These might not be hedonistic instant gratification
“matches” and a “click optimized” algorithm might hide them. But worse, in a
world of “deep personalization” what would even be the point of such titles – if
they were not shareable cultural objects?
8 Conclusion
Given the increasingly personalized “infosphere,” this article has traced some
current practices and their consequences for our epistemic orientation within the
broader social world. I started with some background ideas about social and
epistemic dialectics and the importance of the ability to engage in both mutual
recognition and dialectics of contrast and difference – alsowhen it comes to fiction
and its role in shaping our identity and culture. I discussed how the nature of the
personalized “platform” is challenging some of our core existential categories.
Then through analyses of two current forms of algorithmic personalization at
Netflix, tendencies and choices to (1) create deceptive shared world illusions and
(2) remove or further retract what was previously shared world aspects. However,
we also saw (3) a tendency to make it harder to tell if what we are seeing is
personalized or not. Thus, in effect creating an epistemic disorientation. Looking
forward, these concerns are intensified by the fact that the current tendencies are
toward deeper and deeper personalization.
Resisting narratives of technological determinism, I want to stress that some of
the current socially isolating and epistemically harmful personalizations are
purposefully disorienting in that they could have been designed differently. Thus,
aligned with ideas of perspectival knowledge dialectics and the role of social
triangulation, one could design platforms that valued world-orientation.
Explaining solutions are beyond the scope of this paper but some options are (1)
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opt-outs of personalization, (2) transparency – as we navigate – of where the
personalization begins and ends, (3) options to “see what others are seeing,” and
(4) more ways of changing our perspective within the platform. But personaliza-
tion is powerful and profitable, andwemust also look to actionswe can take absent
the cooperation of tech companies. We should share our screens and our screen-
shots – like we saw in the Netflix examples – and create, albeit limited, shared
world documentation. The main question is if we want our “platform society” to
continue its race toward solipsistic experience machine-style personalization or if
we think we can come up with a better path and “prefer” it enough to force a shift
toward optimizing for shareable world values and functionalities.
Again, thispaper isnotmeant asa critiqueof all formsofpersonalization, nor amI
disregarding the value and need for “filtering” and for more homogeneous sub-
cultures. Rather, the point is that one ought to enter an exclusive space willingly and
knowingly, which depends on awareness of the world beyond.18 The fear is that the
current tendencies of algorithmic personalization will continue to deepen and
increasingly socially isolate us. That immersed in our frictionless bubbleswewill tend
toward Piaget’s “egocentrism,”wherewe neither know ourselves or each other, as we
lose our orientation in the broader social landscape needed to anchor that knowledge.
Current algorithmic personalization is programmed inways that does not value social
world orientation. That is – from where I stand – a problem of our shared world.
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